The Rediscovery of Indigenous Thought in the Modern Legal System: The Case of the Great Apes by Fraundorfer, M
This is a repository copy of The Rediscovery of Indigenous Thought in the Modern Legal 
System: The Case of the Great Apes.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/138936/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Fraundorfer, M (2018) The Rediscovery of Indigenous Thought in the Modern Legal 
System: The Case of the Great Apes. Global Policy, 9 (1). pp. 17-25. ISSN 1758-5880 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12517
© 2017 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. This is the peer reviewed 
version of the following article: Fraundorfer, M. (2018), The Rediscovery of Indigenous 
Thought in the Modern Legal System: The Case of the Great Apes. Glob Policy, 9: 17-25. 
doi:10.1111/1758-5899.12517, which has been published in final form at 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12517. This article may be used for non-commercial 
purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. Uploaded in 
accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
 1 
 
The revival of indigenous thought: the great apes as legal persons 
For centuries, chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans and gorillas have been shot, tortured, jailed 
and traded around the world, suffering severe physical and psychological abuse on the hands 
of human beings. In the Anthropocene, with human-induced climate change and the destruction 
RIWKHJUHDWDSHV¶ last natural habitats, these animals may be doomed to disappear from this 
planet forever.    
Various international treaties, such as the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), international organisations like the 
Great Apes Survival Partnership (GRASP), and an almost infinite number of research institutes, 
sanctuaries and other NGOs dedicated to the protection of the great apes and their wildlife 
habitats have not been able to turn the tide. %HWZHHQDQGDORQHµDWRWDODYHUDJHRI
3,174 great apes disappeared each year from the forests of Africa and Asia through illegal 
hunting and tUDGH¶6WLOHVHWDODQGWKHQXPEHURIWKHJUHDWDSHVFRQWLQXHVWRGHFOLQH
rapidly due to natural habitat loss, wildlife trade and hunting (IUCN 2015). According to Steven 
Wise, a US legal scholar and animal rights activist, the global abuse, trade, murder and torture 
of the great apes represent a genocide perpetrated by human beings against members of their 
own kind (Wise 2000: 7).  
Many scholars and animal rights activists argue that welfarist and conservational efforts 
have failed to tackle the root of this on-going massacre: the status of the great apes, and any 
other animal, as legal objects to be treated like things. Therefore, there seems to be only one 
instrument left to save the great apes and other animals from extinction: a change in perspective. 
The transformation of animals from legal things (objects) into legal persons (subjects) would 
change the legal nature of animals before the law and thus create powerful legal restrictions for 
human behaviour towards animals (Dunayer 2013: 35±38).  
Against the backdrop of several looming global catastrophes in the Anthropocene, we 
need to recognise that the human species is just one piece in the larger planetary ecosystem. 
This recognition needs to be reflected in our ways of thinking and doing politics, particularly 
as far as our relationship with other species is concerned. The concession of rights, and as such 
legal personhood, exists to protect the weak and vulnerable from any kind of violence and 
injustice, legally guaUDQWHHLQJµWKDWDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VPRVWEDVLFLQWHUHVWVFDQQRWEHVDFULILFHGIRU
WKHJUHDWHUJRRGRIRWKHUV¶'RQDOGVRQDQG.\POLFND$VORQJDVLQGLYLGXDOVDUHQRW
included in any rights discourse, they are defined as legal property, prone to arbitrary, violent 
and unjust exploitation.  
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The exclusion of some groups of humans from rights discourses ± such as indigenous 
people, black African slaves or women ± has happened frequently in human history and is still 
the case in some societies (Clark 1999; Wise 2000). Legal personhood is not carved in stone 
but is subject to ever-changing power relations, the sway of ideologies and the recognition of 
autonomy to living beings (Wise 2000: 255). Otherwise, how to explain that in many societies 
it is even common to consider ships, trusts and corporations as legal persons (Wise 2000: 248). 
The granting of legal personhood is a means to protect individuals (and things) from 
exploitation. As a logical consequence, rights could also be used to legally protect parts of our 
natural environment from human exploitation and complete destruction. In 2008 and in 2009 
respectively, Ecuador and Bolivia were the first countries worldwide to write the rights of 
nature into their constitutions, providing a constitutional basis for the legal protection of nature 
against human exploitation (Lalander 2014). In March 2017, the government of New Zealand 
granted legal personhood to the Whanganui River due to its importance for the local Maori tribe 
(Roy 2017). Only a few days later, an Indian court ruled that the Ganges and the Yamuna Rivers 
be treated as legal persons to guarantee better environmental protection of the two rivers from 
severe pollution (Safi 2017). In other words, these rivers were granted rights and legal 
personhood because of their ecological and cultural importance, which will provide civil 
society, local communities and government authorities with legal tools to protect those parts of 
nature from the destructive and exploitative impact of humans.  
These decisions were largely inspired by indigenous thought. Many indigenous cultures 
see the world as a living organism where everything is connected. That is, where the modern 
world sees distinctions, separations and hierarchies, indigenous people see connections and 
interrelations. If we want to escape a dystopian future of unprecedented scale, we are forced to 
rethink and reformulate our place on this planet on many fronts. One of those fronts touches 
our relationship with other species on this planet.  
Some scholars argue that the wisdom of indigenous thought contains important clues to 
the challenges and problems in the Anthropocene (Acosta 2013; Behera 2010; Danowski and 
Viveiros de Castro 2016; Shiva 2016, Tickner 2015). By looking at the on-going legal 
developments in the worldwide struggle for legal personhood for the great apes, this article 
argues that we are witnessing an unintended (but welcome) re-introduction of several aspects 
of indigenous thought to modern political and legal thought. The article first introduces the 
philosophical roots of our treatment of non-human animals as legal objects and how scientists 
and animal rights movements have gradually questioned this view in the second half of the 20th 
century. Then, the article introduces the view on humans and animals in the cosmologies of 
 3 
 
Amerindian cultures, characterised by Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro as 
Amerindian Perspectivism. Thereafter, the article traces the legal developments which 
culminated in the historic decision of an Argentine judge to grant legal personhood to a female 
chimpanzee in 2016. In this context, the article seeks to explain to what extent these legal 
developments along with this historic decision represent a revival of indigenous thought 
potentially reshaping our modern worldviews in times of major ecological challenges. 
 
Challenging the blind spot of modern thought: nonhuman animals as objects 
Since Antiquity, and reinforced through the ideological dogmas of monotheist religions such 
as Judaism and Christianity, humans have considered themselves as special among all the 
species on this planet and superior to any other animal, believing that other nonhuman animals 
were made for humans to be used and exploited (Clark 1999; Singer 1990: 185±212; Taylor 
1999: 23±41). Philosophical giants such as Aristotle, Saint Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, René 
Descartes, Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant were instrumental in establishing the dominant 
view that animals lacked consciousness, morality and any cognitive abilities and thus were 
nothing else than dumb and mechanistic objects to be used as a resource and disposed of at the 
whim of humans (Corbey 2013: 69; Taylor 1999: 23±41).   
The derogative view dominating our relationship with other non-human animals is 
therefore not the result of a natural fact but due to a social construction in political and 
philosophical thought, which has framed the understanding of our relationship with other non-
human animals for more than two millennia. The consequences of this view have been 
disastrous for all nonhuman animals, ultimately leading to the first mass extinction of animal 
life on this planet caused by the devastating impact of one species, the human being. The great 
apes belong to those thousands of animals threatened with extinction. What exactly gives 
humans the right to torture, massacre and kill animals at whim as well as wipe them from the 
face of the Earth? AfteUDOOPDQ\DQLPDOVSHFLHVFRQWULEXWHWRWKHIORXULVKLQJRIWKH(DUWK¶V
ecosystems and biodiversity, which guarantees our own survival. Joan Dunayer even argues 
WKDWµ>L@QWHUPVRIWKHLUOLYHV¶REMHFWLYHYDOXHWRPRVWRWKHUEHLQJVKXPDQVSUREDEO\UDQNlowest 
RIDOODQLPDOV¶ (2013: 29).  
 The artificial abyss formed between human and nonhuman life in European 
philosophical thought has not only brought mayhem to all other life forms on this planet. It has 
pushed us, the human species, to the very edges of this abyss. How do we want to survive on a 
SODQHWZKHUHHQWLUHHFRV\VWHPVUHJXODWLQJWKHSODQHW¶VFOLPDWHKDYHEURNHQGRZQGXHWRRXU
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own destructive and arrogant behaviour? Corbey and Lanjouw argue that we have to challenge 
our dominant philosophical traditLRQ DQG PRYH IURP µWKH LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HG HFRORJLFDO
GRPLQDQFHRIKXPDQV¶WRZDUGVDQDWWLWXGHWKDWHPEUDFHVRXUµDELOLW\WRVKDUHUHVRXUFHVDQG
VSDFHDVZHOODVWRUHVSHFWHDFKRWKHU¶VQHHGVDQGVHOI¶ 
Many animal rights activists and scholars base their arguments for animal rights on the 
fact that animals are sentient beings, just like us, feeling pain and suffering from violence. 
Scientific evidence has abundantly shown that animals are not machine-like beings, as thought 
by those philosophers responsible for the artificial formation of the abyss between humans and 
nonhuman animals. On the contrary, all vertebrates can be considered as sentient beings. In the 
same vein, all invertebrates who have a brain or at least a nerve system are also sentient 
(Dunayer 2013: 35). Apart from emotional abilities, many nonhuman animals have impressive 
cognitive abilities as well. The great apes represent just one of the most poignant examples.  
Pioneers like Jane Goodall, Dian Fossey and Biruté Galdikas were the first 
primatologists to seriously question the artificial boundaries between human beings and the 
great apes with hard evidence (Fossey 2000; Galdikas 1995; Goodall 2010). Beginning in the 
1950s, these three women had lived for years together with the great apes in their natural 
habitats ± Goodall with chimpanzees, Fossey with gorillas and Galdikas with orangutans ± to 
observe and study their behaviour and social lives. Their research results revolutionised the 
field of primatology and our view of these creatures. Today, it is an established and 
scientifically undisputed fact that human beings and the great apes share the same common 
ancestor and that human beings diverged from this common evolutionary line only about seven 
million years ago (Boehm 1999; Diamond 1993: 94).  
It is certainly right that the great apes lack those extraordinary abilities that made human 
beings build cities and aeroplanes, land on the moon and shape huge parts of the surface of this 
planet according to their own needs and interests. Less than two percent of the genetic material, 
however, is finally responsible for this major evolutionary development of the human being. 
The genetic material of humans and chimpanzees/bonobos only differs by 1.6 per cent. The 
genetic material of gorillas differs about 2.3 per cent from that of humans. And the genetic 
difference of the orangutan is about 3.7 per cent (Diamond 1993: 94). To put it differently, the 
closest living relative of chimpanzees and bonobos is neither the gorilla nor the orangutan but 
the human being (Diamond 1993: 95). Given the genetic similarity between chimpanzees and 
KRPR VDSLHQV VRPH VFLHQWLVWV DUJXH WKDW µ>Z@H KXPDQV DSSHDU DV RQO\ VOLJKWO\ remodelled 
chimpanzee-OLNHDSHV¶:LOGPDQHWDO7KXVLWPDNHVcomplete sense to enlarge 
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the family of the genus homo by including not only homo sapiens (human being) but also homo 
troglodytes (chimpanzee) and homo paniscus (bonobo) (Wildman et al. 2003: 7182).    
This close genetic similarity is also reflected in appearance and behaviour. Studies on 
the territorial behaviour of chimpanzees provide us with invaluable insight into our own 
territorial behaviour, which ultimately culminated in the creation of nation-states (de Waal 
2007; Goodall 2010). The egalitarian and hierarchical features in chimpanzee and bonobo 
societies make us better understand our own societies that are constantly marked by hierarchical 
power struggles and egalitarian ambitions (Boehm 1999; de Waal 2007; Goodall 2010). 
Chimpanzees and bonobos are capable of organising themselves in alliances to create power 
balances (Boehm 1999; de Waal 2007). They create hierarchies to organise their societies 
(Boehm 1999; de Waal 2007). They are aware of notions of fairness and unfairness; they are 
competitive and power-driven; they engage in efforts of reconciliation after fights and power 
struggles; they know how to deceive and free-ride; and they are capable of altruistic behaviour, 
caring about the well-being of others (Boehm 1999; de Waal 2013, Goodall 2010, Fossey 2000, 
Cavalieri and Singer 1993). In other words, the great apes show us how notions of morality, 
cooperation, power and empathy have evolved over millions of years (de Waal 2013).  
In light of the scientific evidence regarding just one group of animal species, the 
artificial abyss formed between humans and nonhumans by a long line of philosophers does not 
make sense at all. On the contrary, scientific evidence points into a new direction in which the 
emotional and cognitive abilities of other nonhuman animals can only be properly respected by 
conceding them a set of inviolable rights. This idea is not entirely new in modern philosophical 
thought. There have always been thinkers and philosophers defending a more sympathetic and 
humble view towards nonhuman animals.  
In Antiquity, Pythagoras, Empedocles and Theophrastus RQH RI $ULVWRWOH¶V SXSLOV
emphasised the similarities regarding emotional and cognitive abilities between humans and 
animals. Francis of Assisi held that animals needed to be esteemed (Taylor 1999: 23±41). 
Jeremy Bentham famously argued in favour of legal rights for animals by writing that a decision 
to give animals legal rights should not be based on cognitive or linguistic abilities but the ability 
to suffer (Taylor 1999: 23±41). Although those thinkers harboured more sympathetic views 
towards nonhuman animals, they never bothered to develop them into major treatises, which is 
why these ideas did not unfold any practical impact (Cochrane 2010: 29±49).  
This changed in the 1970s when the Australian moral philosopher Peter Singer 
published his book Animal Liberation, the first major treatise on animal rights based on the 
argument that the interests of animals should be considered because of their sentience 
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(Cochrane 2010: 29±6LQJHU6LQJHU¶VWUHDWLVHVSDZQHGDQDEXQGDQWOLWHUDWXUHRQWKH
recognition of the interests of animals, resulting in the proposals of various rights frameworks 
debating how and under which circumstances rights and which kind of rights could be conceded 
to which kind of animals (Taylor 1999; Wise 2000).    
Given the strong similarities between humans and the great apes, the early 1990s 
witnessed a global movement advocating the application of a particular rights framework to the 
great apes. In 1993, under the leadership of the two philosophers Paola Cavalieri and Peter 
Singer, scientists from different disciplines including philosophy, ethics, education, law, 
anthropology, biology and primatology launched the Great Ape Project (GAP). This global 
initiative demanded that great apes enjoy similar basic moral rights as humans: (1) the right to 
life, (2) the protection of individual liberty and (3) the prohibition of torture (Cavalieri and 
Singer 1993). In practical terms, GAP has sought to implement these three basic rights, 
stipulated in the World Declaration on Great Apes, by rescuing and liberating great apes from 
zoos, circuses or amusement parks and give them a new home in sanctuaries where they are 
provided with high-quality care, medical treatment and protection from human aggression and 
abuse.  
 The last few decades have witnessed a gradual change in perspective in our relationship 
with other animals, particularly with our closest living relatives, and philosophers and political 
theorists have resuscitated sidelined strands of modern philosophical thought. This new 
evolving perspective, however, would not come as a surprise to indigenous cultures from the 
American continent who have always seen animals as persons.  
 
 
Amerindian Perspectivism: animals as subjects  
The Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro is famous for having coined the 
concept of Amerindian Perspectivism, based on his theoretical and practical studies of µa limited 
number of native cultures from Lowland South America (mainly from Western Amazonia) and 
from septentrional North America (Northwest Coast, N. AthaSDVNDQ1$OJRQTXLDQ(VNLPR¶ 
(Viveiros de Castro 2012: 63). He showed that Amerindian indigenous tribes have an entirely 
different view on humanity and its relationship with other beings. According to Amerindian 
cosmologies, µthe way humans perceive animals and other subjectivities that inhabit the world 
± gods, spirits, the dead, inhabitants of other cosmic levels, meteorological phenomena, plants, 
occasionally even objects and artefacts ± differs profoundly from the way in which these beings 
see humDQVDQGVHHWKHPVHOYHV¶ (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 47).  
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Typically, in normal conditions, humans see humans as humans and animals as animals; 
as to spirits, to see these usually invisible EHLQJVLVDVXUHVLJQWKDWWKHµFRQGLWLRQV¶ are 
not normal. Animals (predators) and spirits, however, see humans as animals (as prey), 
to the same extent that animals (as prey) see humans as spirits or as animals (predators). 
By the same token, animals and spirits see themselves as humans: they perceive 
themselves as (or become) anthropomorphic beings when they are in their own houses 
or villages and they experience their own habits and characteristics in the form of culture 
± WKH\VHHWKHLUIRRGDVKXPDQIRRG>«@WKH\VHHWKHLUERGLO\DWWULEXWHV>«@DVERG\
decorations or human instruments, they see their social system as organised in the same 
ZD\DVKXPDQLQVWLWXWLRQVDUH>«@9LYHLURVGH&DVWUR±48) 
In Amerindian thought, animals are perceived as people or persons with their own (humanised) 
cultures to the same extent that spirits, the dead, plants and other subjectivities are. This does 
not mean that for these indigenous cultures animals are the same as humans. There are 
differences between humans and animals. Under certain points of view, however, some animals 
are (or become) humans. The jaguar, for example, is human but at the same time a jaguar with 
a hidden feature that is human, meaning that humanity (or personhood) is a capacity of the 
jaguar (Viveiros de Castro 2013: 484).  
This idea of Perspectivism, however, does not apply to all animals. Amerindian thought 
particularly attributes personhood to animal species which have a key symbolic and practical 
role to play in Amerindian cultures, such as predators like the jaguar or the vulture or animal 
prey like fish, deer or monkeys (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 53; Viveiros de Castro 2013: 353). 
,QWKLVVHQVHµSHUVRQKRRGDQGµSHUVSHFWLYLW\¶± the capacity to occupy a point of view ± is then 
DTXHVWLRQRIGHJUHHDQGRUFRQWH[W>«@UDWKHUWKDQRQHDEVROXWHGLDFULWLFDl property of some 
species and not of others¶ (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 54). The possibility of including other 
beings and/or animal species remains always open EHFDXVH LQ $PHULQGLDQ WKRXJKW µthe 
personhood of animals (and of humans) is in effect a question of context¶ (Viveiros de Castro 
2012: 54).   
The key difference between modern thought and AmerLQGLDQ WKRXJKW µis that of an 
original VWDWHRIXQGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQRU³XQGLIIHUHQFH´GRQ¶WPLVWDNH WKLV IRU³LQGLIIHUHQFH´RU
³VDPHQHVV´ EHWZHHQ KXPDQV DQG DQLPDOV¶ (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 55). In Amerindian 
WKRXJKW µthe original common condition of both humans and animals is not animality, but 
rather humanity¶ (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 56). Animals, such as the jaguar or the vulture, are 
humans clad in animal cloths to hide their true human form, which is only visible to members 
 8 
 
of their own species or trans-specific beings like shamans (Viveiros de Castro 2013: 351). Thus, 
animals are persons and see themselves as such. 
One of the implications of thH$PHULQGLDQ>«@ ontology is, indeed, that there are no 
autonomous, natural facts, for what we see as µQDWXUH¶ LV VHHQ E\ RWKHU VSHFLHV DV
µFXOWXUH¶ i.e., as institutional facts ± what we see as blood, a natural substance, is seen 
by jaguars as manioc beer, an artefact; our mud is the hammock of the tapirs and so on. 
(Viveiros de Castro 2012: 112) 
Given the fact that humans and animals share human roots and that animals are seen as humans 
and persons, it does make a lot of sense that Amerindian cosmologies do not distinguish 
EHWZHHQ µFXOWXUH¶ (as reserved for humans) DQG µQDWXUH¶ (as reserved for animals) and also 
largely lack a proper collective cRQFHSW RI µDQLPDO¶ RU µQRQKXPDQ DQLPDO¶ as opposed to 
µKXPDQ¶. While these indigenous languages certainly do have words that in their translations 
FRUUHVSRQGWRµDQLPDO¶, the actual meaning of these words often refers to what me might denote 
DVLQIRUPDOPHDQLQJVRIµDQLPDO¶VXFKDVµpre\¶µYLFWLP¶RUµgame¶ (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 
78±79). TeUPVIRURXUFRUUHVSRQGLQJZRUGµDQLPDO¶ are used in a distributive, relational and 
perspectival VHQVH UDWKHU WKDQ WR GHQRWH DQ µDQLPDO NLQJGRP¶ in opposition to humans and 
humanity (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 78±79).  
Humans are a species among others, and sometimes the differences internal to humanity 
are on par with species-VSHFLILFRQHV>«@,IWKLVLVWUXHWKHQDWOHDVWRQHEDVLFPHDQLQJ
of the standard opposition between nature and culture must be discarded when we move 
to Amerindian contexts: nature is not a domain defined by animality in contrast with 
culture as the domain of humanity. The real problem with the use of the category of 
µnature¶ in these contexts, therefore, lies not so much with the fact that animals also 
KDYHRUDUHLQµFXOWXUH¶, but rather with the assumption of a unified non-human domain. 
(Viveiros de Castro 2012: 78) 
To the VDPHH[WHQWWKDWWKHZRUGVIRUµDQLPDO¶ have different meanings in Amerindian cultures, 
thHZRUGVIRUµKXPDQEHLQJ¶ are also used very differently. Instead of denoting humanity as a 
species (homo sapiens), Amerindian words for human being UHIHUWRWKHµVRFLDOFRQGLWLRQRI
SHUVRQKRRG¶ (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 97), functioning as pronouns rather than nouns and 
emphasising the point of view of the subject rather than the belonging to a particular group or 
the human species. 
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This is why terms such as wari` (a Txapakuran word), masa (a Tukanoan word) or dene 
DQ$WKDSDVNDQZRUGPHDQµpeopOH¶, but they can be used for ± and therefore used by 
± very different classes of beings: used by humans they denote human beings; but used 
by peccaries, howler monkeys or beavers, they self-refer to peccaries, howler monkeys 
RUEHDYHUV >«@$V LW KDSSHQV KRZHYHU these non-humans placed in the subjective 
SHUVSHFWLYHGRQRWPHUHO\µFDOO¶WKHPVHOYHVµSHRSOH¶; they see themselves anatomically 
and culturally as humans (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 99±100).  
Instead of treating animals as legal objects, Amerindian thought sees animals as subjects 
without creating an artificial realm to separate humans from nonhuman animals. Amerindian 
cultures are very clear in their conviction that humans are just one species among many and 
that all living species have the capacity to be persons, depending on the context and the 
situation. AmerLQGLDQV UHFRJQLVH WKDWDQLPDOV µare subjects not because they have cognitive 
capabilities similar to ours, be it noted, but because we all share the same embodied awareness 
of being-in-the-world¶ (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 119). In this regard, Amerindian 
Perspectivism can be characterised as anthropomorphic, for it attributes human qualities to 
animals. But it is far from being anthropocentric (Viveiros e Castro 2012: 100±101), 
establishing between humans and other beiQJV µrelations, totalities, connections, and 
HPEHGGHGQHVVHV¶ (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 61 ZKHUH PRGHUQ WKRXJKW SRVLWV µsubstances, 
individuals, separations, and oppositions¶ (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 61).  
 When looking at the astonishing legal developments in the modern world over the last 
few years in changing the perspective on the great apes, it is remarkable to witness that key 
aspects of Amerindian Perspectivism are at the same time silently crawling into the underwood 
of modern philosophical thought, gradually reshaping our very relationship with other species.  
 
 
An emerging change in perspective: nonhuman animals as legal persons 
Following the launch of the Great Ape Project in the early 1990s, no significant progress had 
been made in granting legal personhood to the great apes. Several countries worldwide, among 
them New Zealand, the US, Japan and countries of the EU, did introduce legislation to better 
protect the welfare of the great apes, such as banning or limiting the use of great apes in 
research, prohibiting private ownership of the great apes or creating sanctuary systems (AWA 
1999; Chimp Act 2000; Chimp Haven is Home Act 2007; Michigan State University 2015; 
Project r&r 2017). These measures, however, did nothing to change our relationship with the 
great apes, let alone turn them into legal persons.   
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 In the early 2000s, animal rights activities in Europe and the Americas embarked on a 
different strategy which does have the potential to bring about a fundamental change in 
perspective. Animal rights activities started to challenge the court system and file writs of 
habeas corpus, allowing lawyers to challenge the illegal detention and imprisonment of a legal 
person. Since the law does not regard great apes as legal persons, these writs of habeas corpus 
serve to challenge this legal view and establish legal personhood for the great apes in legal 
systems throughout the modern world.   
In 2005, several Brazilian animal rights organisations filed a writ of habeas corpus in 
favour of the female chimpanzee Suiça, living in the Zoological Garden of Salvador, Bahia, 
with the request to transfer her, after a favourable court ruling, to the Sorocaba Sanctuary for 
Great Apes in the state of São Paulo, one of several great apes sanctuaries of the Great Ape 
Project (Cruz 2006). Shortly before the final court decision, Suiça was found dead in her 
enclosure, which brought to an abrupt end any further court proceedings (Cruz 2006). The 
responsible judge, Edmundo Cruz, however, accepted the debate on potential personhood for 
the great apes to draw attention to the issue and make it the subject of ample debate. In his 
RSLQLRQ µFULPLQDO SURFHGXUDO ODZ LV QRW VWDWLF EXW VXEMHFW WR FRQVWDQW FKDQJH ZKHUH QHZ
decisions have to get adapted to PRGHUQWLPHV¶&UX], own translation). Cruz also 
EHOLHYHGWKDWHYHQZLWK6XLoD¶VGHDWKhis writ would not end the debate and continue to provoke 
controversies (Cruz 2006: 284).   
In 2009, the GAP Project together with other Brazilian animal rights organisations filed 
a lawsuit against the city of Niterói in the Brazilian state of Rio de Janeiro, in order to free the 
chimpanzee Jimmy, held captive in a private zoo in Niterói and who became famous as a painter 
(GAP 2009; Rogar 2010). The judges of the Court of Rio de Janeiro differed very much in their 
opinion from Judge Edmundo Cruz and rejected the request of habeas corpus outright (GAP 
2011). At least, the Brazilian Environmental Institute IBAMA was successful in closing the zoo 
on the basis of irregular conditions (Jimmy lived in a tiny concrete enclosure behind bars). 
Jimmy, together with other animals, was transferred to one of GAP¶V sanctuaries in the state of 
São Paulo (GAP 2011).  
Austrian animal rights activists prepared a lawsuit in 2007 to protect the chimpanzee 
Hiasl by appointing him a human being as his legal guardian (GAP Germany 2009). Hiasl was 
IUHHG E\ DFWLYLVWV IURP D SKDUPDFHXWLFDO ODE DQG ODQGHG LQ 9LHQQD¶V DQLPDO VKHOWHU, which 
normally receives cats and dogs (Balluch and Theuer 2007: 337). Due to high maintenance 
costs, the animal shelter wanted to sell Hiasl (most likely to a zoo, circus or lab) or have him 
euthanised (GAP Germany 2009; Balluch and Theuer 2007: 337). According to animal rights 
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activists, the only way to avoid +LDVO¶V sale or euthanasia would have been to change his status 
from a thing to a person, whose eventual sale or euthanasia would then be seen as a criminal 
offence (GAP Germany 2009). In the same vein, the recognition of Hiasl as a person would 
also have given KLVGHIHQGDQWVWKHULJKWWRVXHWKHSKDUPDFHXWLFDOODEUHVSRQVLEOHIRU+LDVO¶V
initial kidnapping from his African home, his subsequent imprisonment and maltreatment 
(Hiasl had to live in a windowless basement in tiny cages of about 0.7 m x 1.2m at the beginning 
and cages of 2.2m x 2.2m at the end of his imprisonment) (Balluch and Theuer 2007: 335, 341). 
Similarly, if Hiasl had been recognised as a person, he or his defendants could legally have 
received donations to improve his situation, which is not possible due to +LDVO¶V status as a thing 
*$3*HUPDQ\$IWHUERWKWKHSURYLQFLDOFRXUWDQG$XVWULD¶V6XSUHPH&RXUWKDGdenied 
the petition for a legal guardian, +LDVO¶V defendants brought the case before the European Court 
of Human Rights, where the case was rejected in 2010 (ORF 2013).  
In the US, the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP), headed by legal scholar Steven M. 
Wise, and supported by other rights organisations, legal scholars and famous primatologists, 
such as Jane Goodall, prepared an ambitious long-term multi-state litigation campaign, in which 
NhRP started to file lawsuits in several US states to grant personhood to imprisoned and 
personally owned chimpanzees. The state of New York, due to its very favourable legal context 
for habeas corpus lawsuits, was selected as the first state for lawsuits to be filed in December 
2013 (NhRP 2013a). The lawsuits involve four chimpanzees held captive in different places in 
the state of New York: Tommy, who lives an isolated life in a cage in a trailer lot; Kiko, who, 
also caged, had to work in the entertainment industry; and Hercules and Leo, owned by a 
research centre and subject to medical experiments (NhRP 2013a). So far, all courts have denied 
the four chimpanzees the recognition as legal persons (NhRP 2013b).  
The NhRP also filed a lawsuit against the State University of New York at Stony Brook 
that held captive the chimpanzees Hercules and Leo. While again the New York Supreme Court 
Judge Barbara Jaffe denied habeas corpus relief to Hercules and Leo, she explained in her 
justification in July 2015 that she was bound by precedent (she was also the responsible judge 
in the cases of Tommy and Kiko) and recognised that chimpanzees could be legal persons in 
the future. At the same time, she conceded WKDWµ>F@ourts, however, are slow to embrace change, 
DQGRFFDVLRQDOO\VHHPUHOXFWDQWWRHQJDJHLQEURDGHUPRUHLQFOXVLYHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIWKHODZ¶ 
(Supreme Court of the State of New York 2015).  
After this first indirect concession of the possibility of nonhuman rights for 
chimpanzees, a decision by an Argentine court caused some furore. In Buenos Aires on 18 
December 2015 an Argentine criminal appeals court categorised the female orangutan Sandra 
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of the Buenos Aires zoo as a nonhuman person. The responsible judge Elena Amanda Liberatori 
emphasised that by categorising Sandra as a nonhuman person, she does not enjoy the benefits 
of human rights, which, in her opinion, are not transferable to nonhuman beings. Instead, the 
term of nonhuman person means recognising her own rights as part of our obligation to respect 
life and the dignity of sentient beings (Intimate Ape 2015).  
While this decision was interpreted by many animal rights organisations and the media 
as an important breakthrough in the recognition of legal personhood for the great apes, a closer 
look at the decision revealed that the criminal court in question only had the power to treat cases 
of animal mistreatment. Therefore, the whole case was regarded by the court as an animal 
welfare issue without DQ\ ELQGLQJ FRQVHTXHQFHV RQ 6DQGUD¶V OHJDO VWDWXV (Wise 2015). It 
appears, however, that even with regard to welfare protection, the court ruling has had no 
consequences whatsoever. Even two years after the jXGJH¶VUHFRJQLWLRQRI6DQGUD¶VEDVLFULJKWV
she is still imprisoned in the Buenos Aires zoo, held captive as the only representative of her 
species in a small enclosure of concrete comparable to solitary confinement (GAP 2017a).  
The real breakthrough happened one year later. In November 2016, Maria Alejandra 
Maurício, another Argentine judge in the city of Mendoza granted legal personhood to the 
chimpanzee Cecilia, arguing that Cecilia had been illegally and arbitrarily deprived of her right 
to freedom and a dignified life by the zoo of the city of Mendoza. Cecilia had lived almost her 
entire life in conditions comparable to solitary confinement, locked away in isolation behind 
prison bars in a small enclosure of concrete soil and walls (Poder Judicial Mendoza 2016: 2).  
7KHMXGJH¶VGHFLVLRQZDVEDVHGRQWZRSULQFLSDODUJXPHQWV (Poder Judicial Mendoza 
2016: 32±43): first, animals are sentient and emotional beings. The great apes in particular 
distinguish themselves through their genetic proximity to humans, their cognitive abilities, their 
use of tools and their own cultures. And second, the human being today stands at a crucial 
ecological crossroads where humanity is confronted with self-inflicted ecological disasters and 
catastrophes. By referring to theories of Gaia (the Greek goddess of mother Earth), Pachamama 
(the Andean goddess of mother Earth) and indigenous thought ± which all hold that the Earth 
is a living organism and that all the species and ecosystems, including humans, are interrelated 
± she emphasised that it was our human responsibility to protect the environment and the 
ecosystems which the human being is also a natural part of. Thus, the most effective way to 
protect the great apes is to recognise them as legal subjects entitled to nonhuman rights. In her 
decision, Judge Maurício stressed that the concession of legal personhood to the great apes is 
not about giving the human rights but the recognition that they are subjects rather than mere 
objects. 
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As a consequence of this unprecedented and historic court ruling, Cecilia, the first 
nonhuman legal person in history, was liberated from her life-long prison and transported to the 
GAP sanctuary in Sorocaba in the Brazilian state of São Paulo (Poder Judicial Mendoza 2016: 
43). In April 2017, Cecilia arrived at her new home in Brazil, stepping for the first time in her 
life on green grass and climbing a real tree (GAP 2017b); things so fundamental to a 
FKLPSDQ]HH¶VQDWXUDOKDELWDWDQGQDWXUDOZD\RIOLYLQJWKDt had been denied Cecilia for almost 
her entire life. She met other members of her own species and even found a new friend, 
Marcelino, a chimpanzee who was born in the sanctuary (GAP 2017c); another fundamental 
right that Cecilia had been deprived of for almost her entire life.  
These legal developments, which culminated in the unprecedented recognition of a 
chimpanzee as a legal person and legal subject, have started to UHGHILQHWKHPHDQLQJRIµDQLPDO¶
DQG µKXPDQ EHLQJ¶ in ways reminiscent of Amerindian Perspectivism. Amerindian cultures 
recognise the humanity of other nonhuman animals because of their awareness of being-in-the-
world, the fact that they live, breathe, feel and suffer just like us. That is, that they are sentient 
beings. In addition, Amerindian thought has never doubted the existence of cultures among 
animals; and any idea of an animal as a machine-like thing without feelings and thoughts or an 
µDQLPDONLQJGRP¶ separated from and inferior to human beings would be incomprehensible. 
For Amerindians, animals are µhumans in disguise¶ and therefore it is unthinkable to create 
those distinctions and separations we are so familiar with in modern philosophical thought. 
Modern science has, over the last few decades, clearly demonstrated how close the great apes 
are to ourselves ± in terms of genetics, cognitive abilities and behaviour ± and that we definitely 
sharH D FRPPRQ KXPDQLW\ ZLWK WKRVH µKXPDQV LQ GLVJXLVH¶. Therefore, there is no other 
possibility than to concede legal personhood to the great apes and finally rediscover what 
Amerindians have never forgotten: that humans are just one species among many without any 
entitlement to subdue, dominate and exploit entire species and ecosystems.  
 
The renewed relevance of indigenous thought 
When we look into the searching eyes of a chimpanzee, we may catch a glimpse of ourselves 
in a distant past long buried by the passing of millions of years. Modern science made it possible 
for us to understand and value this deep connection. In Amerindian cultures, it is shamans who 
communicate with other animals through their capacity to assume alternating points of view. 
Shamans can see animals as humans and humans as animals as well as look at the world through 
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the eyes of animals. Modern scientific discoveries have opened our eyes for the human traces 
in animals and animal traces in humans, blurring the line between humans and other animals.  
 Amerindian cultures have always taken for granted what in the modern world is only 
starting to take hold now: that personhood is a question of context and situation. Rather than 
relying on absolute values, the possibility of including other beings in the realm of personhood 
and considering them as subjects remains always flexible. The initiators of the Great Ape 
Project have always emphasised that the recognition of basic rights for the great apes can only 
be the first step in a revolutionary movement that should extend to other animals as well (ideally 
to all sentient beings) (Wise 2000; Cavalieri 2015). This way many other animals could be 
saved from extinction and the daily cruelties perpetrated by humans. And even more than this, 
it might be a way to save our own environment, our ecosystems and ourselves from complete 
destruction. 
Thus, it does not come as a surprise that in July 2017, a court in Bogotá, Colombia, 
granted nonhuman personhood to the bespectacled bear Chucho who had been moved from the 
natural reserve of Río Blanco to the zoo of Barranquilla. The court order freed the bear from 
his captivity in the zoo of Barranquilla and ordered to move Chucho back to his old home in 
WKHQDWXUDOUHVHUYHDQDUHDPXFKFORVHUWRWKHEHDU¶VQDWXUDOKDELWDW(O+HUDOGRIt would 
not come as a surprise either if in the months and years to come elephants, dolphins, whales 
and other animals were granted legal personhood and a set of fundamental rights. 
If we want to stand a chance in the Anthropocene, we will need to rethink our 
relationship with other species. We need to recognise that we are intrinsically connected to the 
species living on this planet. The abyss formed by modern philosophical thought to artificially 
separate us from all other animals is no longer unbridgeable. Several bridgeheads, piers and 
posts are being built. One of the unintended consequences of these bridgeworks refers to our 
rediscovery of philosophical traditions that had been buried away in the nooks and crannies of 
this abyss for a very long time. 
Key tenets of indigenous thought, and in our case Amerindian cultures, are creeping 
back into our consciousness and may help us to correct some errors and aberrations of modern 
philosophical thought. They may help us to find a way over the abyss that is not only threatening 
the survival of almost all animal species on this planet but essentially the survival of ourselves.  
As Eduardo 9LYHLURVGH&DVWURHPSKDVLVHG µQot only would Amerindians put a wide berth 
between themselves and the great Cartesian divide, which separated humanity from animality, 
but their views anticipate the fundamental lessons of ecology which we are only now in a 
position to assimilate (Viveiros de Castro 2012: 95). 
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  Indigenous thought, particularly Amerindian Perspectivism, can guide us in the 
question of how to view and treat the great apes and other animals. It can also guide us in our 
future actions and thoughts in the Anthropocene.  
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